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Abstract:  Transformation of the philosophy of science during the last three 
decades is largely based on the philosophers’ insights in the experimental 
side of science. Central issues in this new field, such as classification of basic 
elements and types of experimentation, are still developing. Subject of this 
work will be one of these types, Steinle’s „exploratory experimentation“ (EE), 
and its place in taxonomy of experimentation. After presenting an array of 
historical cases of experimentation, I analyze Elliott’s systematization of EE 
subtypes. I will claim that it does not represent development of Steinle’s ide-
as, although it can be used to improve taxonomy of experimentation in gene-
ral. Special attention will be dedicated to the development of this taxonomy 
and understanding forms of experimentation not focused on theory testing 
– specifically EE.
1. Introduction
In recent decades, philosophy of science has turned its focus away from 
scientific theory. Since science started to be regarded as a historical phe-
nomenon, and individual cases examined systematically, it quickly be-
came clear that the experimental dimension of scientific practice is large-
ly neglected. A standard view during twentieth century, from Duhem to 
Popper, understood experiment only as means of testing scientific the-
ories. Turning attention to actual historical cases of experimentation 
brought the key insight that experiments are often carried out for other 
reasons than theory testing. Initiated by Hacking’s work (1983, ch.9), 
this return to Baconian variety of relations between experiment and the-
ory has pervasive consequences for the philosophy of science.
An increasing number of case studies in history of experimental science 
created significant and necessary material for understanding the actu-
al role of experiment. The first classification of elements characteristic 
for experimentation was offered by Hacking himself (1988, 508-11). Al-
though it does not purport to be definitive, this taxonomy is invaluable 
for philosophy of science, as it provides (at least tentative) framework 
for classifying the various forms of experimental practice. Here we will 
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be using it in a form simplified by Galison (1988, 525), where experi-
mentation comes down to the following four elements:
1)  The objective of experimental research – questions about some 
specific topic (e.g. determining some specific correlations, cal-
culation of some constant, choosing between rival theories...),
2)  The  establishment  of  knowledge  prior  to  experimentation 
(background knowledge, fundamental theory, theory of instru-
mentation  (i.e.  experimental  equipment),  phenomenological 
(concrete, verifiable) hypotheses ...),
3)  The experimental equipment (object being tested, devices inter-
acting with object, detectors measuring the interference),
4)  Data and data manipulation (data production, processing (as-
sessment, reduction, analysis), and interpretation).
All these elements are highly plastic. For example, we can modify the 
question (1) in the middle of the experiment, data (4) can be selected or 
abandoned in many ways, and computer programs that commonly re-
duce and analyze data are very sensitive to modifications in the theory 
of instrumentation (2) (cf. Hacking, 1988, 512).Complex interplay pat-
terns of these elements make a framework for classifying various types 
of experimentation. This paper will focus on the experimentation type 
known as “exploratory experimentation”. It is investigated especially by 
Friedrich Steinle, and his opinions will be discussed in the third sec-
tion. Kevin C. Elliott’s development of Steinle’s work, and my critical 
review on Elliot, will be subject in the fourth and fifth section. I will 
also try to clarify consequences of my criticism for general taxonomy of 
experimentation; specifically, upper Galison’s taxonomy. Before that, I 
will briefly introduce several recent studies in history of scientific ex-
perimental practice.
Historical work itself, prerequisite for development and critique of ex-
perimental philosophy, is not always clearly separable from philosophi-
cal work. Therefore it is desirable to keep certain reserve to these ex-
perimentation case studies. However, they are invaluable for finding 
interrelationship patterns of instrumentation, experimental questions, 
theories, and other elements present in an acceptable taxonomy of ex-
perimentation. Presentation of historical studies will focus on methods 
used to obtain experimental results. Examples have been chosen to il-
lustrate diversity in this respect, and specifically, of course, to support tHE nOtIOn anD StrUCtUrE OF ExPlanatIOn In tHE natUral anD SOCIal SCIEnCES
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the philosophical solutions discussed in this paper. All of them will be 
instances where theory testing, traditionally regarded as the only form 
of experimentation, is not playing a major role.
2. Historical cases of experimentation
2.1 Cosmic rays
Karl Jansky located in the 1930s the source of interference in transatlan-
tic radio communications coming from the center of our galaxy. Work-
ing in the same laboratory in 1965, radio-astronomers Arno Penzias and 
Robert Wilson adapted the radio telescope, originally created to detect 
radio waves deflected from the Echo balloon satellites1, in order to study 
this phenomenon. According to the former astronomical beliefs, they 
expected to find energy sources in the Milky Way and other galaxies. 
Trying to measure these energy sources and other points in the sky, they 
received values “around 3.5oK more than expected” (italics added), with 
excess temperature isotropic, unpolarized, and independent of season-
al (July 1964 to April 1965) and daily variations (Penzias & Wilson, 1965, 
419-20). The obtained result of radiation uniformly distributed in space 
was not expected due to any previous astronomical theory, and the lack 
of ways to interpret it caused some hesitation in Penzias and Wilson to 
publish results; they did so only after thorough check of used instru-
mentation and acquired results.
This accidental discovery of cosmic microwave background radiation 
coincided with theoretical work of Dicke, Peebles & Wilkinson, which 
as a consequence of the Big Bang predicted explosion residues in the 
form of temperature uniformly distributed throughout the Universe 
(Penzias &Wilson, 1965, 420). This subsequent interpretation made     the 
cosmic radiation, from previously an unusual experimental result, an 
important confirmation of today accepted cosmological theory of the 
Universe creation.
2.2 Galvanism
At the end of the 18th century, after Galvani discovered animal electric-
ity, numerous researchers conducted experiments regarding this phe-
nomenon (see Trumpler, 1997). The first reaction was to check his re-
sult; whoever did it tried to get a positive result (ibid, S76 – 7). What is 
1   The first passive communications satellites launched by NASA in 1960. and ‘64. 
These first spacecrafts were metalized balloons, primarily used as passive reflectors 
of microwave signals.ExPlOratOry ExPErIMEntatIOn anD taxOnOMy OF ExPErIMEntatIOn MILUTIN STOjANOvIć
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particularly interesting is that each of these verification experiments 
was different2. However, nearly everyone was unconvinced in Galvani’s 
theoretical explanation – that spasms in the frog muscles are caused 
by animal electricity. In the absence of theoretical guidance, many re-
searchers have started to systematically vary those elements they sus-
pected are the key ones (from the metal used for muscle stimulation, 
to the sexual maturity of dissected frogs). Published results contain de-
scriptions of more than a thousand different experiments. 
According to Trumpler’s classification, they can be divided into four 
groups (ibid, S77 – 80). Experiments in the first group seek to simpli-
fy the phenomenon by eliminating redundant or finding necessary ex-
perimental procedures and elements; strategy especially important for 
accidental discoveries, such as Galvani’s. The second group includes at-
tempts to optimize the effect – in this case, finding experimental condi-
tions that amplify muscle contractions, which served as the test of the 
phenomenon. In that aim, variations were, for example, carried out in 
terms of age or gender of frogs. The third group Trumpler calls “explora-
tion”: it contains experimental setting variations without some guiding 
principle in mind.3 Finally, the fourth group are experimental setting 
adjustments, either for some practical application or testing related 
phenomena. Critical to note is that these groups are not clearly bound-
ed and that a variant of the same experiment often falls into several 
groups, especially in the first three (which are usually the focus of phi-
losophy of experimentation)4. In the end, no theory or even an empiri-
cal generalization didn’t came out as a result of this research – it was not 
even determined whether electricity is included into the phenomenon. 
All that was obtained in this relentless experimental work is abundance 
of individual cases descriptions.
2.3 Electromagnetic induction
Rapid  development  of  electromagnetism  in  1831.  faced  the  ques-
tion whether magnetism affects electricity. Michael Faraday, probably 
2   Although the main cause of this is that most researchers have not been properly 
introduced to Galvani’s experimental procedure, it wouldn’t be correct to say that 
this makes the case unrepresentative. In fact, checking results (mainly due to practi-
cal reasons) is usually performed only when there is at least a newer (more precise) 
instrument available.
3   Perhaps the more appropriate name for this group of experimental variations 
would be “systematic varying”.
4  The fourth group is an interesting insight into intertwining of scientific (experi-
mental) practice, but this is a goal that exceeds the current paper.tHE nOtIOn anD StrUCtUrE OF ExPlanatIOn In tHE natUral anD SOCIal SCIEnCES
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stimulated by recent improvements in electromagnets, designed an ex-
periment with two separate coils wound on the iron ring. Connecting 
the first coil to the battery, fugacious current was induced in the second 
coil. This result was not sufficient to claim effects of magnetism on elec-
tricity. Due to complexity of the original experimental setting, Faraday 
designed second experiment5 which didn’t involve coil connected to the 
power source: it consisted only of one magnet and one coil connected to 
a galvanometer. After many variations of this simplified experiment, it 
became clear that the relative motion of the magnet and the wire is the 
essential factor. Further variations of this movement produced a large 
number of specific, concrete experimental variations, indescribable in 
a general way. To this end, Faraday attempted to formulate an empiri-
cal regularity by searching for the reference system in which to express 
the relative motion of the wire and the magnet (Steinle, 2002, 417): he 
tried with the magnetic poles, the direction of the wire, the magnet’s 
axis direction, the compass directions, Ampere’s hypothetical circular 
currents within the magnet, and “magnetic curves” – patterns formed 
by iron filings around the magnet (Faraday, 1932a, § 114, f.). Only in the 
last case he was able to formulate regularity consistent with the experi-
mental results gained: the current is induced in the wire as long as it in-
tersects the magnetic lines (Faraday, 1932a, §114 and 1932b, §260).This 
regularity not only successfully explained all experimental results, but 
also allowed Faraday to deduce other induction effects. It introduced 
the concept of magnetic curves into scientific thinking. This concept, 
later renamed “lines of force”, will become fundamental of electrody-
namic field theory. 
2.4 the Dna microarray
Paul Spellman and collaborators conducted in 1998. a series of experi-
ments aiming to understand the regulation of gene expression during 
the cell cycle (see Franklin 2005, 891). The most important difference 
compared to the previous experiments in this area was instrumentation 
used: a microarray enables measuring the relative expression of all cel-
lular messenger RNA. While previous instruments could measure the 
presence and quantity of one mRNA per measuring in an experiment 
that lasts longer than a day, a microarray can measure 25 000 equally 
5   What is counted as a different experiment, and what as a variation, is a matter of 
degree and convenience. Here, contrary to the previous section, by “experiment” is 
meant a series of variations within one experimental setting (for e.g. variation in the 
material of the core and the wires, geometry of the setting, battery type, etc.).ExPlOratOry ExPErIMEntatIOn anD taxOnOMy OF ExPErIMEntatIOn MILUTIN STOjANOvIć
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informative measurement at once (more than one scientist, with pre-
vious technique, could measure in the entire life) (Franklin 2005, 892). 
During experiments with microarrays, researchers have collected a to-
tal of 400 000 individual measurements of the mRNA levels, and with 
Fourier’s analysis was determined that around 800 genes exhibits a vari-
ation in the mRNA level during the cell cycle – a dramatic increase com-
pared to approximately 100 genes that were previously known to have 
this property. The experiment wasn’t investigating a particular hypoth-
esis or set of mechanisms, but the goal was to observe the regulation 
of genes during the cell cycle and to create a “catalog” of genes whose 
transcript levels vary (Spellman et al, 1998.6 according to Franklin, 2005, 
892-3). Scientists themselves have barely begun to deal with the incred-
ible amount of data resulting from this experiment. They are posted on 
internet site, and some laboratories are fully dedicated to analyzing the 
data collected only in this experiment.
3. Exploratory experimentation
Taxonomy of experimentation presented in the introduction creates in-
definite logical space, not clear exactly for how many types of experi-
mentation. Moreover, it is not clear whether there are clearly distin-
guishable types, or just different, more or less overlapping forms of 
experimentation.7 However, if we limit ourselves to the first element of 
the upper taxonomy – the aim of experimental research – certain classes 
can be distinguished.
First, traditionally is considered that there are experiments designed in 
order to test certain theories. Much, of course, depends on what exact-
ly counts as theory, but closer analysis will not be possible here. Char-
acteristic example is famous Arthur Eddington’s measuring of starlight 
deviation by the Sun’s gravitational field, during the solar eclipse in 1919, 
in order to test the theory of general relativity. In theory-driven experi-
mentation scientists have well-formed theory on mind, from the de-
sign and conduction of the experiment, to its assessment. These exper-
iments are characteristically constructed with particular expectations 
of different possible outcomes, and instrumentation is usually made in 
such a manner to allow detection of only those alternatives.
6  Comprehensive Identification of Cell Cycle-Regulated Genes of the Yeast Saccha-
romyces cerevisiae by Microarray Hybridization”, Molecular Biology of the Cell 9, 
3273–3297.
7   Perhaps in the form of diachronic, partly related traditions (see Galison, 1988, 
526-7)tHE nOtIOn anD StrUCtUrE OF ExPlanatIOn In tHE natUral anD SOCIal SCIEnCES
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Friedrich  Steinle emphasizes an alternative  to  theory-driven experi-
mentation which he calls “exploratory experimentation”. It is experi-
mentation “driven by the elementary desire to obtain empirical regu-
larities and to find out proper concepts and classifications by means of 
which those regularities can be formulated” (Steinle, 1997, S70). The 
most significant feature of this experimental work is systematic varia-
tion of the experimental parameters. It is guided by unspecific guide-
lines, methodological in character, and results in a variety of broadly 
dispersed experiments (Steinle, 2002, 422). Among the most important 
methodological guiding principles there are:
  – varying a large number of different parameters;
  – determining necessary (essential) and modifying parameters; 
  – seeking stable empirical rules;
  – finding appropriate (linguistic)representations for formulation 
of these rules;
  – constructing “simple”, “elementary”, or “pure” cases, where rules 
are presented in particular clarity (Steinle, 1997, S70) .
Philosophically the most interesting feature of exploratory experimen-
tation (EE) is its epistemic significance. Its cognitive goal is to find em-
pirical rules and systems of these rules; which each subsequent theory 
in that field will have to explain or incorporate. Experimental discov-
ery (discussed in (2.1)) that each part of the universe has a tempera-
ture about 3.5oK higher than expected is an example of this relationship. 
Difference between experiment and observation here is not relevant 
because in this context they both have the same epistemic goal – em-
pirical regularity.8 Background cosmic radiation is not description of fi-
nite number of sources, but generalization that pertains to indefinitely 
many individual cases. Discovery that cosmos uniformly radiates has an 
immense scientific value, regardless of the encompassing theory.
In many cases regularity formulation requires revision of existing con-
cepts and categories, or the formation of new ones. Stable and general 
formulation of the experimental results is not always possible within 
existing classificatory and conceptual schemes. A typical case, partially 
the basis of Steinle’s philosophy of experimentation (1995, 1997, 2002), 
is Faraday’s discovery presented in section (2.3). The focus of Faraday’s 
8   More on observation in sciences with “historical” elements (astronomy, evolution-
ary biology...) as a form of “natural-history experimentation” will be in the last section.ExPlOratOry ExPErIMEntatIOn anD taxOnOMy OF ExPErIMEntatIOn MILUTIN STOjANOvIć
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experimental procedure used for capturing empirical regularity was 
hampered by insufficiency and inadequacy of the conceptual means  – 
known alternatives for fixing the coordinate system could not enable 
formulation of the regularity. Stable regularities are obtained only by 
acknowledging that these categories are inappropriate and by forma-
tion of “magnetic curve” concept. This term isn’t discovered indepen-
dently and then applied to experimental results; it is formed during the 
complex process in which experimentation and conceptualization were 
closely intertwined (Faraday, 1832, §114; Steinle, 1997, S71, and more 
generally in 2002, 421).9
The case of electromagnetic induction is in a sense ideal. In many other 
cases the epistemic goal of EE – finding empirical regularities – is not 
reached. An example is the case of galvanism presented in section (2.2). 
Despite exhaustive experimental work, desired result of phenomeno-
logical regularity or correlation is not achieved. On the other hand, this 
case is a paradigmatic example of methodology-driven research. Ex-
tensive variation of the experimental parameters, searching for the es-
sential elements and conditions, and optimization of experiment (con-
struction of “simple” or “pure” cases) – are precisely the features of EE 
emphasized by Steinle.
Two important points are evident in this example. First, not every EE re-
sults in phenomenological regularity and Steinle is aware of this (1997, 
S72). Its defining characteristic is holding specific cognitive objective, 
not necessarily its fulfillment. Otherwise, success and failure in this re-
spect are not always easy to distinguish, because the aimed scope of 
empirical regularity is a pragmatic question and a matter of explorer’s 
choice (Steinle, 2002, 420). In addition, we must not lose sight of the 
note from the beginning of this section – that this whole classification 
of experimentation types is assorted only with respect to the first ele-
ment of Galison’s taxonomy of experimentation – the aim of the experi-
mental research. The experiments that, according to the epistemic aim, 
will be classified as EE may consist of significantly different experimen-
tal procedures.
Second point is that Steinle’s views on EE result from the analysis of spe-
cific historical cases of experimentation. They are based on the analysis 
of Dufay, Ampere, Faraday, and Goethe’s work. Empirical foundation of 
9  According to Steinle, “One reason for the great complexity of such formation pro-
cesses is that concepts and classification schemes cannot be “tested”, but rather have 
to prove their appropriateness in some way” (1997, S71).tHE nOtIOn anD StrUCtUrE OF ExPlanatIOn In tHE natUral anD SOCIal SCIEnCES
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his approach is characteristic of the so-called “New experimentalism” 
(shift in the philosophy of science inspired by Hacking’s work) and, in 
particular, for the upper Galison’s taxonomy. This position is reached 
by a process similar to one Steinle attributes to cases of EE. Certain in-
completeness (or openness) of Steinle’s philosophy of EE, and Galison’s 
classification of experiments are both just the products of this empirical 
(i.e. inductive) approach.
4. Theoretical foundations of 
establishing a classification of EE
Kevin Elliott tried, based on Steinle’s and others works about EE, to de-
velop systematic characterization of EE and classification of its sub-
types (Elliott, 2007). Development of principled set of categories or 
dimensions for organizing EE, Elliott bases on what he considers the 
most fundamental, uncontroversial features of EE. First, all the au-
thors which point out EE as a form of experimental practice are react-
ing against the previous philosophical literature that considered entire 
experimental work as a means of theory-testing. Hence, from this nega-
tive perspective, “the most fundamental characteristic of EE seems to 
be that it ... does not serve the aim of testing theories or hypotheses” 
(Elliott, 2007, 10).10 From this negative trait results a positive feature of 
EE: “Because EE does not involve testing specific predictions of a par-
ticular theory, there is a “looseness” in its structure that allows for, and 
encourages, variation in the experimental data collected.” (ibid, italics 
added). The first, negative trait of EE implies also its third main charac-
teristic – the role that theory plays in guiding EE.
Based on these three fundamental features of EE, Elliott develops EE 
classification scheme by suggesting three dimensions in which EE types 
vary (2007, 10):
(I)  The positive aim of the experimental activity;
(II)  The role that theory plays in the experimental activity;
(III)  The methods or strategies used for varying parameters.
10  This is strictly speaking a mistake because Steinle, discoverer, so to speak, of 
EE says exactly the opposite: “Although exploratory experimentation is not theory-
driven, it is not the counterpart of theory-driven experimentation. There may be 
various types of experimentation not driven by theory. Exploratory experimentation 
is but one of them, namely that one which has the goal of finding empirical rules and 
systems of those rules.” (1997,S71)ExPlOratOry ExPErIMEntatIOn anD taxOnOMy OF ExPErIMEntatIOn MILUTIN STOjANOvIć
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These dimensions are framework for organizing forms of EE, developed 
by principle, and needs to be filled with characteristic examples of ex-
perimentation (Elliott, 2007, 9-10).
The problem with Elliott’s EE systematization is that it is based on the 
negation of an inappropriate, pre-hackingian understanding of experi-
mental practice. First, deduction of the scientific practice forms from 
principles seems, to say the least, very strange: if we want to know what 
activities scientists are involved in, it is best to analyze actual cases. In 
addition,  “fundamental  feature”  not-serving-to-theory-testing  is  not 
what drives, enables or guides any experimentation. It is only its negative 
quality – EE also doesn’t serve to technological innovation, but so what? 
Taking this as “the most fundamental characteristic” looks like a cate-
gorical error. Secondly, deriving proposed dimensions from cited funda-
mental characteristics is far-stretched. This is particularly the case with 
the first dimension – from that that theory testing is not the aim of EE, 
it does not follow that the experimental activity has a positive goal (I). 
These remarks, however, are not crucial because the most important 
thing about Elliott’s classification is whether it provides an adequate 
framework for classification of EE subtypes. To test this, we will closely 
examine proposed dimensions in which experimentation vary. We will 
check them using the known cases of experimentation, and by compar-
ing them with Steinle’s theoretical framework and Galison’s taxonomy. 
I will claim that this systematization is not an improvement over Stein-
le’s approach in a sense that it fails to clarify and organize EE in the in-
tended manner. Nevertheless, some of its elements can be adjusted to 
contribute understanding experimental practice in general.
4.1 the positive aim of the experimental activity
Before the first dimension is examined closer, at first glance you see that 
its name is identical to the first element of Galison’s taxonomy. Elliott’s 
addition is in sketching some characteristic types of experimental aims 
(2007, 19):
(a)  Identifying regularities and developing new concepts;
(b)  Isolating or manipulating particular entities or phenomena;
(c)  Developing experimental techniques, instrumentation or simu-
lations;
(d)  Resolving anomalies.tHE nOtIOn anD StrUCtUrE OF ExPlanatIOn In tHE natUral anD SOCIal SCIEnCES
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(a) is explicitly taken from Steinle. (b) is focused on entities. It sounds 
like completely different thing than regularities or concepts (a), but 
how we are going to experimentally grasp these entities? Entities are 
known only through regularities. Consequently, (b) and (a) are interde-
pendent. It is no wonder that Steinle (1997), who stressed out (a), and 
Burian (1997), who stressed (b), were both accredited for discovering EE 
to the philosophy of science.
(c) is considered by Steinle as EE condition or initial part – e.g. Ampere’s 
development of “astatic needle”, instrument for terrestrial magnetism 
isolation, which eventually led to the electric circuit discovery (2002, 
413-4). In addition, it is unclear why (c) in general should be counted as 
EE, and not as some separate type of experimentation.11 Finally, distin-
guishing (d) as an exploratory aim is very problematic, because it does 
not look like an elementary goal. Rather, it is a very complex process 
that  involves, perhaps,  theory-testing, experimental study of anom-
alous phenomena, and theory modification. More importantly, (d) is 
significantly intertwined with theory and theory-testing, hence the fact 
that involves EE at some point doesn’t make it an EE subtype.
Therefore, except in the first two points, it is doubtful that (I) is pre-
senting “exploratory” aims. Hence, and especially because of (a) and 
(b)’s interdependence, presented aims are not diverse enough to consti-
tute some sort of “dimension”. It is necessary to have more “characteris-
tic exploratory aims”; otherwise we are on the same place where Steinle 
and Burian have led us to. It wouldn’t make any difference if we, on the 
other hand, try to look on (I) as presenting aims of experimentation 
in general, instead specifically of EE. Developing instrumentation (c) 
would still need additional arguments to be accounted as an aim of ex-
perimentation, and not as its preparatory work, and (d) would be inap-
propriate because of its intertwining with theoretical work. If this is so, 
then this whole “dimension” comes down to Steinle and Burian’s ideas, 
and does not constitute any improvement over the first element (1) of 
Galison’s taxonomy.
11   Elliott says himself that “a number of authors are starting to emphasize that 
EE of the sort that creates instrumentation, simulations, and effective experimental 
protocols [(c)] is necessary in order to make EE of the sorts described by Steinle 
and Burian [(a) and (b)] possible” (2007, 11), but he doesn’t explain why this type of 
preliminary experimenting (c) should nevertheless be assorted into EE, and not as 
a separate kind of experimentation. Also, as mentioned earlier, one should consider 
Steinle’s suggestion that creation of instrumentation is part of the experimental pro-
cess, not an authentic experimental aim, and therefore would not fall under (I) at all.ExPlOratOry ExPErIMEntatIOn anD taxOnOMy OF ExPErIMEntatIOn MILUTIN STOjANOvIć
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4.2 the role that theory plays in experimental activities
As for the role that theory plays in the experimental activities (II), Elli-
ott (2007, 19) differentiates types when the theory is:
(e)  Playing a minimal role relative to other forms of experimentation;
(f)  Providing background information;
(g)  Serving as a starting point or contrast;
(h)  Being constituted by exploratory projects or strategies.
Varying types of EE in this dimension does not seem problematic at 
first glance, since it is possible to distinguish experiments more or less 
guided by theory. Steinle’s example of electromagnetic induction pre-
sented in (2.3) contains minimum theoretical participation (e). Greater 
theory guidance – expressed in more extensive theoretical background 
knowledge (f) – is present in Franklin’s example from (2.4). However, 
(e) is a negative role – it only says that theory is (almost) absent. Back-
ground knowledge (f) can vary in different experiments, but it is not 
certain whether there is any, if at all clear, criterion for distinguishing 
degree of its presence. (g) is another point too sophisticated with re-
spect to the proposed criterions. Elliott (g) associates with (d) because 
“[t]heory seems especially likely to play this role when EE has the aim of 
resolving anomalies.” (2007, 13) This further complicates the situation 
because we have seen (d) is not an elementary goal and “determining 
how [...] a particular theory has gone wrong or how it applies in a some-
what new context [purpose of (g)]” (ibid.) also looks as a complex theo-
ry-role, and hence not a proper subtype of EE. In addition, it should be 
examined whether the theory not serving as a starting point or contrast 
(g) is today possible at all, because, in Hacking’s words, it seems that 
only the mind powered by the theoretical models can begin to solve the 
mysteries of modern science (1983, 154). If this is really inevitably, than 
(g) wouldn’t be a theory-role peculiar to EE, but a necessary condition 
of modern experimentation in general.
Exploratory strategies that structure research (h) according to Elliott 
“play something like the traditional role of “theory” in a particular do-
main”(2007, 13). These “research patterns” fundamentally restructure 
scientific disciplines and areas of knowledge. This is originally Galison’s 
idea of experimental tradition’s on which the stability of science rests 
(1988, 526-7), and it is an essential insight into the history of science. tHE nOtIOn anD StrUCtUrE OF ExPlanatIOn In tHE natUral anD SOCIal SCIEnCES
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However, this is a leap from individual experiments to the entire class, 
and it belongs to the meta-level compared to the one which is analyzed 
in the other points. I do not see how this feature of experimental tradi-
tion can be classified as the role that theory plays in experimental prac-
tice (II) – namely, the fact that theory is constituted by research strate-
gies (h) still leaves room for her to take some role from (e-g) and so far 
we can’t say that (h) belongs to this dimension.
Therefore, even if we exclude (h), we are left with the problem of dif-
ferentiating (e-g) and the issue of complexity and of general presence 
of (g). Even without (g), (e) and (f) are not discernible clearly enough, 
in order to this dimension makes a difference in the form of discernable 
types of EE – and without them the mere observation that the degree 
of background knowledge may vary (on which (e) and (f) reduce) does 
not bring anything not already included in the second element of Gali-
son’s taxonomy (2).12
4.3 Methods or strategies for varying parameters
Finally, the third dimension of EE “diversity” – methods or strategies 
for varying experimental parameters (III) – leaves a significantly differ-
ent impression than the first two. It contains the following forms (Elli-
ott, 2007, 19):
(i)  Working as an individual investigator to vary elements of an ex-
perimental setup;
(j)  Using multiple experimental techniques to characterize a phe-
nomenon;
(k)  Using “high-throughput” instrumentation to collect large quan-
tities of data;
(l)  Working as a community to design a range of experiments that 
vary key parameters;
(m)  Developing models and simulations that can vary parameters.
(i) is non-controversial, although quite uninformative case. Conducting 
experiment at community level (l) is typical for many experiments today 
– some research has become so complex that it is actually impossible for 
a single researcher to carry them out. This division of scientific labor is 
12   Over and above, for (e) and (f) to be EE subtypes, besides proposing criterion 
for identifying the degree of background knowledge, it is necessary to explain how 
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an interesting epistemological phenomenon, and cognitive situation in 
which individual researchers are, and the system of their relations is 
undoubtedly something that demands special philosophical attention. 
Does it form a separate EE type or the relationship of community to the 
world remains the same (as of an individual) is another matter, and the 
answer is not provided by Elliott. Namely, the change in the epistemic 
position of an individual scientist (who is in (l) only a part, not a whole) 
does not imply that there has been a change in the character of the re-
search – that an aim of research, theory-role or a method or strategy for 
varying parameters are changed. It is possible that (l) is the same as (i), 
only on a grand scale and with certain epistemic blindness of the indi-
vidual researchers; and so far not a special kind of strategy for varying 
parameters (III). It is possible there is nothing methodologically new in 
it. After all, every scientist in the world, as part of the scientific commu-
nity, relies on the work of other scholars and it is not even certain that 
the aforementioned epistemological situation is specific particularly to 
(l), and not to modern science in general.13
Using multiple experimental techniques and instruments (j) was point-
ed out by Burian in (1997). He argues that this EE type is especially 
important for molecular biology because of contingent historical pro-
cesses by which biological regulatory systems were developed. This is 
associated with Brandon’s idea that biological sciences require more 
descriptive work than fields such as physics, because of a large num-
ber of contingent parameters (Brandon, 1994, 69). This kind of experi-
mental work, which extensively includes contingent and/or historical 
elements, it is not necessary to understand as EE. Following Steinle’s 
suggestion (1997, S69) Maureen O’Malley suggests to understand it as 
a separate form of experimentation (in addition to EE and theory-test-
ing14) (2007, 14). This type she calls “natural history/experimentation” 
(NHE). It includes various activities of discovery, classification, com-
parison and testing of special features, and generally deals with phe-
nomena that are less controllable (O’Malley, 2007, 14). It is character-
istic of the sciences, such as astronomy and molecular biology, dealing 
with phenomena unique (or unrepeatable) in the world. Considering 
historical studies conducted in the last three decades, as far as I know, 
and especially according to Burian’s (which is Elliott’s basis for (j)), 
Franklin’s and O’Malley’s works on molecular biology, it seems the use 
13   For more about this epistemological phenomenon of intertwined knowledge 
and methodology as characteristic of modern science in general see (Hardwig, 1991).
14  Further, theory-driven experimentation (TDE).tHE nOtIOn anD StrUCtUrE OF ExPlanatIOn In tHE natUral anD SOCIal SCIEnCES
213
of many techniques (j) usually goes within the experimentation that 
could rather be classified as NHE than EE.
Finally remains the use of “high-throughput” instrumentation (k), and 
the development of models and simulations (m). (k) as an EE type is ex-
tensively discussed in (Franklin, 2005), from where example presented 
in section (2.4) is taken. As the main reason why it represent a separate 
type, Franklin emphasizes the question of research efficiency, which 
is manifested in massive amounts of data, unachievable through con-
ventional instrumentation (2005, 897). However, this method for vary-
ing parameters threats to expand, as Franklin foresees, to include other 
forms of experimentation (including TDE) (ibid.), and thus ceases to be 
an EE subtype.
A similar point could be noticed for (m).15 The development and use of 
models and simulations (m) is possible to use as for EE, as in order to 
test certain theories. Consequently, my suggestion would be to under-
stand (k) and (m) as methods for varying parameters regardless of the 
type of experimentation, and to set them as dimensions by which all ex-
perimentation may vary, not just EE. They should then be incorporated 
into Galison’s taxonomy, as a revision of its third element – the experi-
mental equipment. This way we would get a general account of experi-
mentation, since mentioned types are characteristic for several forms of 
experimentation, including EE.
To summarize, it is an open question whether (l) represents a particular 
method for variation of parameters, or not. (i) is completely uninforma-
tive and the only significance derives from the contrast with (problem-
atic) (l). Classifying (j) as an EE type is misidentification; on contrary, 
relevant studies show that (j) usually appears as a form of NHE. Finally, 
(k) and (m) are not methods specific to EE and it would be better to un-
derstand them as methods or strategies of experimentation in general.
5. Conclusion
It is not at all clear that it is possible to develop taxonomy of experimen-
tation from particular principles as Elliott claims. There is no systematic 
15  And also for the above-discussed (L) (if it turns out it is a type of (III)). Namely, 
working as a community – which is the essence of (L) – occurs in TDE cases also. 
A characteristic example would be the search for the Higgs boson at CERN. Here, 
however, caution is needed, because, as O’Malley points out, scientists sometimes 
present other forms of experimentation as TDE, in order to facilitate obtaining funds 
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connection between subtypes, and it is insufficient for one principled 
system to produce only already known types. Moreover, these types are 
problematic even if we understand them as empirical generalizations, 
that is, classification of EE derived from known cases. We have seen 
that, when the problematic forms are precluded, the aims of experi-
mental activity (I) and the role of theory in it (II) as they are character-
ized in  Elliott’s systematization are reduced respectively to (1) and (2) 
of Galison’s taxonomy and Steinle’s analysis of EE. And Elliott’s third di-
mension does not succeed in its aim of distinguishing between different 
types of EE, although it highlights important elements for understand-
ing experimentation in general.
Here I have particularly in mind the use of high-throughput instrumen-
tation (k), and developing models and simulations (m), as forms of ex-
perimental methods or strategies characteristic to all types of experi-
mentation. If we would place this Elliott’s (reduced) dimension instead 
of “experimental equipment” (3) as the third element in Galison’s tax-
onomy, we would improve it in the following way: (3) does not points 
out specifically in what way the object-apparatus-detector system (ex-
perimental equipment system) can vary (cf. Hacking 1988, 509), and 
Elliott’s (k) and (m) 16 do just that. (k) and (m), as can be seen in Elliott 
(2007, 14-5), are essentially the choice of (certain) instrumentation, and 
therefore they are a natural development of the Galison’s category “ex-
perimental equipment” (3). These two specific types of “methods, strat-
egies or instruments” enable variation of the experimental equipment 
at an open series, analogously to variation of other elements (or dimen-
sions) of this taxonomy.17
My opinion is that Elliott’s systematization of EE, when elements (spe-
cifically or at all) not belonging to EE are removed, does not contribute 
directly to further understanding of EE. All these remaining elements 
are already pointed out by Steinle and Burian, with the exception of 
Franklin’s example from (2.4). If you look closely at this case of experi-
menting, we see its characteristic trait – high-throughput instrumen-
tation, does not deviate from the EE aim – search for empirical regu-
larities and classificatory schemes. As Franklin points out, Spellman & 
associates had aimed “to observe the regulation of genes during the cell 
16   (k) is due to Trumpler (2005), and (m) due Morgan (2003).
17   Moreover (3), thus understood, would be independent of the other dimensions, 
i.e. (1) and (2); unlike Elliott’s dimensions where aims of experimentation (I) in some 
cases can be used to condition the used methodology (III) (2007, 10-11).tHE nOtIOn anD StrUCtUrE OF ExPlanatIOn In tHE natUral anD SOCIal SCIEnCES
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cycle and to create a ‘catalog’ of genes whose transcript levels vary” (see 
above, 2.4). By identifying that “around 800 genes exhibits a variation 
in the mRNA level” they precisely achieved the epistemic goal Steinle is 
emphasizing, although by significantly different form of instrumenta-
tion. Characteristic of Steinle’s approach to EE is that it leaves space for 
the development of new experimental methods, techniques and instru-
ments. Because of this incorporated openness it fits perfectly in taxono-
my like Galison’s, because its forms are free to vary by the dimensions of 
experimental equipment / methods or strategies for varying parameters 
(3) and the state of knowledge prior to experiment (2).
It seems to me that Elliott’s analysis provided a clearer understanding 
of experimentation in general, although in a negative way: developing 
Galison’s taxonomy by Elliott’s proposals we have clarified the outer 
boundaries and extracted features non-specific to EE. Talk about di-
mensions (or more precisely sets, as there is no continuity of the forms) 
by which experimentation varies, when applied to experimentation in 
general, rather than EE, enables taxonomy which naturally accommo-
dates openness of experimental science to new methods. It provides 
understanding of experimentation  forms without restriction  to cer-
tain methodologies and theory-roles. Following Hacking’s idea that the 
growth of knowledge is too “motley” – it is not to expect that it is cur-
rently reducible, or that will stick in the future to one methodological 
framework (1983, 152). Perhaps we should focus only on aims and not 
differentiate types of EE according to other dimensions – methods or 
theory roles. Keeping the name “EE” for the search for empirical regu-
larities will enable exactly this hackingian methodological openness of 
experimental science.
Primljeno: 27. novembra 2013.
Prihvaćeno: 17. decembra 2013.
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Milutin Stojanović
Istraživačko eksperimentisanje i taksonomija eksperimentisanja
apstrakt
Preobražaj  filozofije  nauke  tokom poslednje  tri decenije dobrim delom 
zasniva se na uvidu filozofa u eksperimentalnu stranu nauke. Centralne 
stvari u ovom polju, kao što su klasifikacija osnovnih elemenata i vrsta ek-
sperimentisanja, još uvek su u povoju. Predmet rada biće jedna ova vrsta, 
Stajnleovo „istraživačko eksperimentisanje“ (IE), i njeno mesto u taksono-
miji eksperimentisanja. Nakon predstavljanja niza istorijskih slučajeva ek-
sperimentisanja, analiziraću Eliotovu sistematizaciju podvrsta IE. Tvrdiću 
da ona ne predstavlja razvoj Stajnleovih shvatanja, ali da se može iskoristiti 
za unapređenje opšte taksonomije eksperimentisanja. Posebna pažnja biće 
obraćena na isprepletanost razvoja taksnomije eksperimentisanja i razu-
mevanja oblika eksperimentisanja koja nemaju za cilj testiranje teorije – 
specifično IE.
Ključne reči:  istraživačko eksperimentisanje, taksonomija, Fridrif Stajnle, 
Novi eksperimentalizam, metodologija.